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ABSTRACT 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: We first study how cross-country differences in legal quality and personal 
bankruptcy laws affect the financing of New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs). Second, we study how 
venture capital (VC) investors, as expert monitors and initiators of good governance practices in their 
portfolio firms, moderate abovementioned relationships.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using a unique longitudinal dataset comprising 6,813 NTBFs from six 
European countries, we find that higher quality legal systems increase the use of outside financing. 
Less forgiving personal bankruptcy laws decrease the use of outside financing. More importantly, VC 
ownership strengthens the abovementioned relationships.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper provides new evidence on the link between national 
legal systems and the financing of NTBFs. More significantly, we address recent calls for more 
research that integrates institutional and agency frameworks. Specifically, this paper shows that the 
financing of NTBFs is the outcome of both national institutional frameworks and firm-level corporate 
governance.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: NTBFs play a key role in employment and wealth generation in our 
modern knowledge-based economies. Yet, access to sufficient and adequate financing is a critical 
barrier in the development of these firms. This study informs policy makers on the role of national 
institutions, firm-level corporate governance and their interaction on the financing strategies of 
NTBFs.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financing, Legal Quality, Personal Bankruptcy Laws, Venture 
Capital 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A rich literature shows how the institutional framework of the country in which firms are 
incorporated impacts their financing. Seminal work on law and finance, for instance, has shown that 
countries with higher quality legal systems have larger and more developed equity and debt markets 
(Armour & Cumming, 2006; Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; Groh, von Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 
2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 1997). Higher quality legal systems increase the 
supply of financing towards firms because they decrease the costs of investors to monitor 
entrepreneurs and curb the scope for entrepreneurs to maximize private benefits (Cumming, 
Schmidt, & Walz, 2010). A largely separate stream of research has focused on how firm-level 
corporate governance systems relate to firms’ financing strategies. Agency theorists in particular 
have, for example, focused on the role of large (and often public) shareholders as governance factors 
that may reduce agency problems (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), which influence firms’ financing strategies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
More recently, multiple scholars have called for an integration of the above research streams 
because country-level institutional frameworks and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms 
may operate as interdependent systems in controlling agency problems (Aguilera, Filatotchev, 
Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Strange, Filatotchev, Wright, & Buck, 2009). Several recent studies on Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) have indeed demonstrated that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
systems at the firm level is likely to differ significantly from country to country (Bruton, Filatotchev, 
Chahine, & Wright, 2010; Chahine & Saade, 2011). 
Most studies investigating the role of country-level institutional frameworks or corporate 
governance systems on firms’ financing strategies focus on public firms. Nevertheless, it is generally 
acknowledged that New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs) contribute significantly to the development 
of our modern knowledge-based economies in terms of exports, employment, innovations and the 
like (e.g., Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Knockaert, Ucbasaran, Wright, & Clarysse, 2011; Storey & Tether, 
1998). Due to high information asymmetries and agency problems, these firms face considerable 
difficulties in raising sufficient outside financing (Berger & Udell, 1998). It is hence surprising that to 
date, scholars have primarily focused on the independent effects of either country-level institutional 
frameworks or firm-level corporate governance systems as mechanisms which may ease information 
asymmetry and agency problems and as such facilitate access to outside financing for NTBFs. The 
goal of the present paper is to integrate a country-level institutional perspective and a firm-level 
agency perspective to explain financing strategies in NTBFs. More specifically, we ask the following 
research questions: (a) how do cross-country differences in legal quality and personal bankruptcy 
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laws influence financing strategies of NTBFs and (b) how does venture capital (VC) ownership as a 
mitigating factor of agency risk influence these relationships?  
We focus on VC ownership as an important firm-level governance mechanism in NTBFs 
because VC investors are frequently described as initiators of good governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Knockaert, Lockett, Clarysse, & Wright, 2006; 
Lerner, 1995; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). They are 
typically more actively involved than non-management shareholders in public firms, including 
institutional shareholders (Wright & Robbie, 1998), thereby actively monitoring entrepreneurs and 
decreasing agency risks (Gompers, 1995). Furthermore, VC investors are often one of the most 
important shareholders in NTBFs, ranked second behind entrepreneurs themselves (George, 
Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005). 
To address the research questions, we take advantage of a unique longitudinal database 
comprising a sample of 6,813 NTBFs from six European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Spain and U.K.), of which 606 firms have VC investors as shareholders. While the countries in our 
sample are geographically close to each other, they are characterized by significant differences in 
institutional frameworks (Bruton et al., 2010). Furthermore, focusing on a more homogenous sample 
of developed European countries helps to minimize unobserved heterogeneity among countries 
(Armour & Cumming, 2006).  
The contributions of our study are two-fold. First, this paper expands on previous research 
that studied how cross-country differences in legal systems influence the financing strategies of 
firms. Prior work has largely focused on the relationship between creditor or shareholder rights and 
financing decisions in public firms (e.g., Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; Roberts & Sufi, 2009; Seifert 
& Gonenc, 2012). This is unfortunate because the vast majority of firms never reach the stage where 
they become public (Berger & Udell, 1998) and extant research has shown how financing decisions 
are very different in public versus private firms (Brav, 2009). Moreover, given our focus on private 
NTBFs, we focus on an important but often overlooked aspect of law, namely personal bankruptcy 
laws, and study their impact on the financing of entrepreneurial firms. Although these laws have 
been argued to be particularly relevant for influencing entrepreneurial activity (Armour & Cumming, 
2008), we know little about their role in NTBFs’ financing decisions. While Armour and Cumming 
(2006) show that more forgiving bankruptcy laws stimulate the development of VC markets at the 
country level, they also call for more research that captures the firm-level effects of these laws. We 
contribute to this call with the current study and show how personal bankruptcy laws influence the 
financing strategies of NTBFs. Finally, previous research has studied how differences in the quality of 
legal systems affect the financing behavior of VC investors (Cumming et al., 2010; Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellmann, 2009, Lerner & Schoar, 2005). For this purpose, prior research has exclusively focused on 
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VC-backed firms and the financing provided by VC investors, which raises important selection 
problems (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009; Cumming et al., 2010). We address this shortcoming in 
the literature by studying the role of the quality of legal systems on the financing strategies of both 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.  
A second major contribution of the present research is its contribution to a further 
integration of institutional theory and agency theory (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). On the one hand, 
studies drawing on institutional theory focus on those institutions which shape “the rules of the 
game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3) but largely ignore the impact of firm-level corporate 
governance systems. In these studies, entrepreneurs are more or less passive, and may be 
advantaged or disadvantaged based on the country from which they operate. On the other hand, 
studies drawing on agency theory focus on how corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level 
affect firm development but typically ignore the impact of different institutional frameworks. In 
these studies, entrepreneurs are often assumed to operate within an institutional vacuum. Multiple 
scholars have called for an integration of both perspectives, because our understanding of the 
effectiveness of governance systems would benefit from viewing these systems as operating as a 
bundle of interdependent systems (Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). Nevertheless, 
our understanding of the nature of these interdependencies is limited. This study is one of the first 
that provides large sample evidence of the combined effect of national legal systems and firm-level 
governance factors, such as VC ownership, on the financing of NTBFs. We argue and show that the 
financing strategy of NTBFs is the complex outcome of both national legal systems and firm-level 
corporate governance factors. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide the 
theoretical background of this paper. Then, we develop specific hypotheses. Thereafter, we discuss 
the method, including the sample, variables and econometric approach used. Next, we present the 
main research findings. Finally, we conclude by discussing our results from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Much of corporate governance research is concerned with the mechanisms that mitigate 
agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When NTBFs raise outside equity financing, two related 
types of agency problems may emerge (Gompers, 1995). First, entrepreneurs may invest in projects 
that have high personal returns but low expected monetary payoffs to outside shareholders. When 
entrepreneurs have raised outside equity financing, they still receive all of the benefits related to the 
consumption of perquisites but no longer bear all of the costs. Second, entrepreneurs who possess 
private information may choose to continue investing in value destroying projects. Entrepreneurs, for 
instance, may want to undertake inefficient continuation of their firms because they provide them 
significant private benefits including independence. Additional agency problems may emerge when 
firms raise outside debt financing (Myers, 1977). For instance, entrepreneurs may sell assets to pay 
themselves dividends thereby leaving less value to debtors in case of bankruptcy; they may take 
excessive risks of which the costs are primarily borne by debtors; or they may reject value creating 
projects in which the proceeds would accrue primarily to debtors. Not surprisingly, such agency 
problems make the financing of NTBFs a process fraught with difficulties (Cassar, 2004; Heyman, 
Deloof, & Ooghe, 2008; Gompers, 1995).  
To date, two largely separate streams of work have focused on the factors which may 
mitigate agency problems when NTBFs raise outside financing. First, since the seminal work by La 
Porta and colleagues (1997), a significant body of research has argued and shown that national laws 
affect the costs and benefits of investors related to monitoring entrepreneurs and as such influence 
the supply of outside sources of financing. Specifically, the costs associated with monitoring 
entrepreneurs is lower in higher quality legal systems, which reduces the scope for entrepreneurs to 
maximize private benefits (Cumming et al., 2010). This explains why both equity (including VC) 
markets and debt markets are larger and more developed in countries with higher quality legal 
systems (Armour & Cumming, 2006; Djankov et al., 2007; Groh et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1997) 
thereby increasing the supply of debt and equity financing. 
Second, agency theorists have long considered the monitoring role of large outside 
shareholders as a governance mechanism that may reduce specific agency problems (Brush et al., 
2000; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In NTBFs, VC investors are often one of the 
most important owners next to entrepreneurs themselves (George et al., 2005). Unlike other 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance firms and banks, VC investors are more 
active and act more like reference shareholders (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). VC investors 
engage in extensive monitoring of their portfolio firms through shareholders agreements, 
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differentiated shareholders rights, board membership and intense relationships with management. 
Besides monitoring, VC investors also provide value adding services, including the professionalization 
of their portfolio firms (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Sapienza et al., 1996). Finally, VC investors may signal 
firm quality to other prospective investors, thereby making these investors more likely to contribute 
financing (Janney & Folta, 2003). 
Despite the value of these two separate streams of research, scholars increasingly argue that 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, including block ownership by VC investors, 
differs significantly from country to country (Bruton et al., 2010; Chahine & Saade, 2012; 
Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi, 
& Faraci, 2004). However, to date, we have only limited knowledge on how country-level and firm-
level corporate governance systems operate together and influence the financing strategies of 
NTBFs. Indeed, ambiguous results in the corporate governance literature (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Certo, & 
Roengpitya, 2003) have often been attributed to the lack of attention towards multiple governance 
mechanisms which may interact with each other (Aguilera et al., 2008). Hence, Filatotchev and Boyd 
(2009) state that “although the vast majority of previous corporate governance studies are 
predominantly focused on organizational aspects in a single-country setting, future research should 
also focus on national systems or corporate governance and their interactions with firm-level 
governance factors” (p. 263).  
A major question is whether national and firm-level systems act as substitutes or 
complements. In a substitution framework, national governance mechanisms and firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms may substitute for one another (Dalton et al., 2003). Klapper and 
Love (2004), for instance, show that firms can (partially) compensate for ineffective laws and 
enforcement at the country level by establishing good corporate governance at the firm level. In 
contrast, others suggest that country-level and firm-level governance mechanisms operate in a 
complementary manner (Aguilera et al., 2008). Specifically, higher quality national laws and firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms may mutually enhance each other such that their combined 
presence increases their effectiveness. Chahine and Saade (2012), for instance, confirm the existence 
of a complementary relationship between the level of shareholder protection at the country level 
and board independence at the firm level in reducing IPO underpricing. 
In what follows, we first develop hypotheses on the relationship between country-level 
institutional systems, focusing on the quality of a country’s legal system and on personal bankruptcy 
laws, and the financing of NTBFs. Next, we discuss how VC investors may moderate abovementioned 
relationships. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 
National Legal Systems and the Financing of NTBFs 
 
As higher quality legal systems allow for more transparency and possibilities to enforce 
contracts and thereby reduce the agency costs for outside investors associated with investing in 
firms, higher quality legal systems lead to larger and more developed equity and debt markets (La 
Porta et al., 1997). Much research in the law and finance tradition, however, has focused on the 
development of public equity and debt markets which are only accessible for large and mature firms 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1997), and thereby ignoring those financial markets which are accessible for 
NTBFs, such as the VC market. 
Recently, Groh and colleagues (2010) showed that VC and private equity investment activity 
is positively related to a country’s investor protection in Europe. Higher quality legal systems may 
also be relevant for private debt investors. Djankov and colleagues (2007) investigate cross-country 
determinants of private credit, using data on private and public credit registries. Their results suggest 
that both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are 
associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product. Higher quality legal 
frameworks and corporate governance at the country level are hence expected to increase the 
supply of outside financing, including outside equity and debt, to NTBFs.  
Higher quality legal systems are not only likely to increase the supply of outside financing, 
but may also stimulate the demand for outside financing. First, private equity transactions in 
countries with higher quality legal systems have higher valuations (Lerner & Schoar, 2005). This 
implies that for a given investment, entrepreneurs can retain a larger equity stake, which is 
important because this determines their future financial return and their control over the firm. 
Hence, VC will be more attractive for entrepreneurs operating in countries with higher quality legal 
systems and higher ensuing valuations. Second, the search costs for entrepreneurs are lower in 
countries with higher quality legal systems, as investors are likely to provide financing more quickly 
(Cumming et al., 2010). Many NTBFs require significant amounts of outside financing to fund their 
founding and subsequent development (Cosh et al., 2009; Robb & Robinson, 2012; Vanacker & 
Manigart, 2010). The lower cost of outside financing combined with an increased supply of outside 
financing in countries with higher quality legal systems may stimulate entrepreneurs to demand 
more outside financing. Therefore, 
 
  
10 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher quality legal systems will be associated with the use of more outside 
financing (including outside equity and debt) in NTBFs. 
 
Prior academic research has related entrepreneurship to personal bankruptcy laws (Armour 
& Cumming, 2008). Personal bankruptcy laws are widely regarded as having a direct influence on 
entrepreneurs even when entrepreneurs are seeking to incorporate their firms as limited liability 
firms. First, prior to incorporation entrepreneurs typically use their own sources of financing first 
before raising outside financing (Berger & Udell, 1998). Second, creditors frequently demand 
personal guarantees from entrepreneurs, which is tantamount to “contracting out” the liability shield 
incorporation provides to entrepreneurs (Armour & Cumming, 2008). Hence, national personal 
bankruptcy laws significantly influence the strategies of entrepreneurs. Countries with more forgiving 
personal bankruptcy laws, reflected in the ability of bankrupt entrepreneurs to obtain a fresh start 
(i.e., a discharge from pre-bankruptcy indebtedness) have larger VC markets (Armour & Cumming, 
2008). Aggregate data on the development of VC markets as a whole, however, do not capture the 
details of how individual entrepreneurs adjust their financing strategies in response to different 
bankruptcy laws. Two opposing forces might be at work. On the one hand, outside investors may be 
more willing to provide financing to entrepreneurial firms when bankruptcy laws are less forgiving, as 
these enable investors to recuperate a larger fraction of their investment. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs may limit their demand for outside financing as a result of less forgiving bankruptcy 
laws because these laws increase entrepreneurs’ personal risk when their firms go bankrupt.  
We argue that demand-side arguments dominate, as there is significant evidence that 
entrepreneurs have a strong influence on the financing policies of their firms. Eckhardt, Shane, and 
Delmar (2006), for instance, show how outside investors can only invest in those firms where 
entrepreneurs are willing to raise outside financing. Many entrepreneurs are reluctant to raise 
outside financing because outside investors may limit the independence of entrepreneurs or may 
even push their firms into bankruptcy under certain conditions (Manigart & Struyf, 1997; Sapienza, 
Korsgaard, & Forbes, 2003). For instance, although banks do not intervene in the day-to-day 
operations and strategic planning of firms, when firms are unable to fulfill fixed debt-related 
payments (i.e., interest and principle amount) banks can push firms into bankruptcy (Balcaen, 
Manigart, Ooghe, & Buyze, 2013). Equity investors such as VC investors limit the independence of 
entrepreneurs through their active involvement, although they may also help entrepreneurs to 
realize more than what would be possible when they go it alone. Further, outside shareholders have 
a portfolio perspective and may decide to de-commit themselves from a portfolio firm when other 
investments in their portfolio are expected to create more value. This may lead to bankruptcy 
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(Cumming & Dai, 2012; Dimov & De Clercq, 2006), even if the focal firm would still be viable for the 
entrepreneur. The above is especially problematic for entrepreneurs operating in countries with less 
forgiving bankruptcy laws. For example, while in some countries entrepreneurs are discharged from 
their firm’s liabilities after bankruptcy, in other countries they may be held personally liable for all 
remaining liabilities for a number of years or even indefinitely (Armour & Cumming, 2008). The fact 
that personal discharge is not available strongly increases the personal risk of entrepreneurs and 
limits them to obtain a fresh start and become independent entrepreneurs in the future after having 
experienced a bankruptcy. Hence, entrepreneurs will be less likely to seek outside equity or debt 
financing for their NTBFs in countries with less forgiving bankruptcy laws.  
Overall, although outside investors may be more willing to provide financing to 
entrepreneurial firms when bankruptcy laws are less forgiving, we expect that entrepreneurial 
motives will dominate. Specifically, entrepreneurs operating in countries with less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws will be less likely to seek outside sources of financing. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2: Less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of less outside 
financing (including outside equity and debt) in NTBFs.  
 
VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
AND THE FINANCING OF NTBFS  
 
We argued that higher quality and more forgiving legal systems will be associated with the 
use of more outside financing. So far, however, we have ignored how firm-level governance systems 
may influence the relationship between national legal systems and the use of outside financing. One 
particular firm-level corporate governance system on which we focus in this study is VC ownership. 
VC investors play a particularly important role in NTBFs not only because they are expert monitors, 
but also because they influence the governance systems in their portfolio firms (Gompers, 1995; 
Sapienza et al., 1996; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). VCs are, for example, instrumental in 
expanding the management teams of their portfolio firms with key employees (Jain & Kini, 1999), 
replace them with more professional managers (Hellmann, 1998; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; 
Sahlman, 1990; Barry, Muscarella, & Peavy, 1990) and install more independent directors (Williams, 
Duncan, & Ginter, 2006; Suchard, 2009) that reduce the agency risks related to entrepreneurs’ 
opportunism (Hellmann, 1998). We hence argue that VC ownership will influence the relationship 
between the quality of national legal systems and the use of outside financing in a number of ways. 
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Several arguments may be advanced to suggest that VC ownership substitutes for the quality 
of legal systems at the country level. First, VC investors are known to write extensive contracts which 
govern the relationship between entrepreneurs and outside shareholders (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2004). These contracts can cover gaps in national legal frameworks (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012) as VC 
investors often have the flexibility to adopt or decline specific provisions which affect the level of 
legal protection (Chahine & Saade, 2011; Klapper & Love, 2004). Specifically, the capacity of 
contracting to establish the obligations (typically of entrepreneurs) and privileges (typically of VC 
investors) in different aspects of the investment relationship can remedy for the absence of high 
quality national laws. Consequently, VC-backed firms in countries with weak investor protection may 
still be able to raise significant amounts of outside financing despite weak governance frameworks at 
the country level.  
Second, termination rights and contractual hostages are two mechanisms which may further 
reduce the dependence on national legal frameworks (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012). Termination rights 
entail that VC investors can unilaterally decide to stop providing further (financial) support to their 
portfolio firms. VC investors typically do not provide all financing at once, but rather engage in staged 
financing, which allows them to limit their losses when specific portfolio firms to not perform 
according to expectations (Gompers, 1995). When inside VC investors decide not to provide 
additional financing this often has far reaching consequences, as outside investors will interpret this 
as a negative signal of firm quality, thereby limiting a firm’s ability to raise additional financing from 
new financing sources. Contractual hostages entail that VC investors are often endowed with rights 
to block particular decisions. Such hostages further relieve the dependence on legal frameworks, 
since opportunistic behavior can be blocked directly with limited reliance on national legal systems 
(Abdi & Aulakh, 2012). Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 3A: VC ownership will decrease the positive relationship between higher quality 
legal systems and the use of more outside financing in NTBFs (substitutive relationship). 
 
A different stream of reasoning challenges the above claims and argues for a complementary 
relationship between the quality of national legal systems and VC ownership. Inadequacies in the 
legal enforcement of contracts entail that contractual provisions have a restricted capacity to cover 
for gaps in national legal systems (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012). Contractual governance used by investors to 
reduce agency problems is hence only valuable when investors have access to an effective national 
legal system. Another reason why contractual provisions may be insufficient to cover for gaps in legal 
systems is the incomplete nature of contracts themselves. Specifically, under high uncertainty, the 
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parties involved in a contract are not able to include all contingencies (Hart, 1995). This explains why 
the quality of national legal systems is expected to remain important even when investors are able to 
write extensive contracts. The above entails that VC investors may be more effective in reducing 
agency problems through contractual monitoring when they operate in countries with high quality 
legal systems, which should benefit the likelihood that they will provide additional financial support 
towards their portfolio firms in these countries. The additional financial resources provided by VC 
investors may furthermore provide a positive signal to other prospective investors thereby increasing 
their likelihood of contributing new financial resources as well (Janney & Folta, 2003). This leads to 
the following alternative hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3B: VC ownership will increase the positive relationship between higher quality 
legal systems and the use of more outside financing in NTBFs (complementary relationship). 
 
We previously argued that less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of 
less outside financing in entrepreneurial firms. VC investors, however, are expected to influence the 
relationship between personal bankruptcy laws and the use of outside financing. Specifically, when 
VC investors are present, we expect that entrepreneurial firms will use even less outside financing in 
countries with less forgiving bankruptcy laws. Entrepreneurs typically invest a significant part of their 
personal wealth in their own firms (Berger & Udell, 1998). Consequently, the wealth of 
entrepreneurs is often linked to the outcome of one particular firm. Entrepreneurs will hence avoid 
their firms going bankrupt with all means possible and may even prefer their firms to continue 
although this is inefficient from an economic point of view. For VC investors, however, a specific 
entrepreneurial firm is only one of their investment projects. VC investors are hence less affected 
when one of their portfolio firms goes bankrupt. Indeed, VC investors typically get most of their 
returns from only one or a few successful exits from their larger portfolio in which most investments 
eventually turn out to be outright failures (Sahlman, 1990). When firms raise additional financing 
from increasingly broader pool of equity investors, this may decrease the commitment by any 
investor, thereby increasing the risk of bankruptcy (Dimov & De Clercq, 2006).  
As VC investors are less concerned with the failure of one specific portfolio firm, 
entrepreneurs who raised VC financing in the past might become extremely wary to raise additional 
outside financing. For these firms, raising additional equity financing typically implies increasing the 
size of the VC syndicate and hence reducing VC investors’ commitment, thereby increasing the risk of 
bankruptcy (Dimov & De Clercq, 2006). This is especially detrimental for entrepreneurs in a context 
where entrepreneurs are confronted with less forgiving personal bankruptcy laws. Moreover, all else 
equal, the more outside financing is raised from outside investors the higher will be their power to 
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push firms towards bankruptcy when (financial) problems emerge. While VC investors, for instance, 
are known to support their portfolio firms, it is also well-established that they eventually focus most 
of their attention towards those firms with the highest prospects and de-commit from portfolio firms 
with poor prospects (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). This may make entrepreneurs who previously raised VC 
financing particularly wary to raise additional outside financing in countries with less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4: VC ownership will increase the negative relationship between less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws and the use of less outside financing in NTBFs. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sample and Data Sources 
In order to test the hypotheses, a unique, hand-collected longitudinal dataset of 6,813 NTBFs from 
six European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the U.K.) is used1. NTBFs that 
received VC financing were identified from several public data sources including press clippings, VC 
websites, commercial databases (VentureXpert, Zephyr, country-specific databases). VC-backed 
NTBFs were included if they satisfied four criteria at the time of their initial VC investment. First, the 
initial VC investment occurred between 1994 and 2004. Initial VC investments were divided between 
the pre-bubble, the bubble and the post-bubble investment period as VC investment strategies have 
proven to be significantly different in each period (Gompers & Lerner, 2001) and to mitigate as such 
potential biases due to the selection of VC-backed firms in only one single investment period. 
Second, at the time of the initial VC investment all firms were maximum ten years old. This ensures 
we study young firms that raised VC financing, rather than mature firms that raised buy-out financing 
or other types of private equity financing. Third, firms were active in high-tech industries which were 
identified from the NACE Rev2 classification system. The NACE Rev2 sectors were reclassified into 
more aggregate sectors following the transformation guidelines provided by the European Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA): Life Sciences (Biotech and Pharmaceutical), 
Communication (Telecom), ICT (ICT Manufacturing), Internet Related (Internet and Web Publishing), 
Software and Other (including Aerospace, Energy, Nanotech, Other R&D and Robotics). Fourth, firms 
                                       
1
 Data were gathered through the European VICO project, which is described in detail by Bertoni and Pellón 
(2011). Germany is excluded from our study because almost no relevant accounting data, needed for the 
purpose of this study, is available on German firms.  
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were independent at first investment, which implies they were not controlled (< 50 percent) by a 
third party.  
After the identification of the VC-backed NTBFs, a control group was randomly selected from 
the population of NTBFs that did not receive VC funding, using similar criteria with respect to country 
of origin, founding period (age), high-tech industries and independence as described above. The 
population of NTBFs was derived from the country-specific economy-wide databases or Amadeus 
(Bureau van Dijk). For each VC-backed firm, ten non-VC backed firms were selected. The ten-to-one 
ratio reflects the importance of VC financing for NTBFs (Bottazzi & da Rin, 2002; Puri & Zarutskie, 
2012). It was additionally checked whether firms in the control group had never received VC in any 
form.  
For each firm, yearly financial statement and employment data was collected through the 
Amadeus database or an equivalent country specific database from the year the firms entered the 
database until 2007 or until the firms disappeared (either through bankruptcy or through 
acquisition). This procedure entails that we limit survival bias because our database also includes 
firms which eventually fail. Further, yearly non-financial data such as the number of patent 
applications (Patstat database) or important events that occurred during the period of analysis such 
as Initial Public Offerings and Mergers and Acquisitions were registered. As our study focuses on the 
financing strategies of private firms, 297 firm-year observations were excluded for reason that the 
NTBFs transformed from private into public firms which is likely to have a significant impact on 
financing strategies (Brav, 2009). Pre-IPO years, however, were kept in the database. Finally, 398 
firm-year observations were excluded because of missing data. This results in a final sample of 6,813 
NTBFs of which 606 raised VC, and 50,135 firm-year observations of which 3,734 from VC-backed 
firms. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 provides a description of the sample by breaking down the number of firm by 
country, foundation period and sector. Nearly 25 percent of the firms in the sample are French, 
closely followed by the U.K. (23 percent). Italian firms represent 15 percent of the sample, Belgian 
and Spanish firms each 13 percent and Finnish firms 11 percent. Nearly 37 percent of all firms were 
founded between 2000 and 2004, 31 percent between 1995 and 1999, 18 percent between 1990 and 
1994 and 14 percent between 1984 and 1989. Most firms operate in the software industry (45 
percent), followed by ICT (17 percent), internet (12 percent), life sciences (9 percent) and 
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communication (5 percent). The other industries represent the remaining 12 percent. Obviously, VC-
backed NTBFs and the random sample of non-VC-backed NTBF will not perfectly match with each 
other since entrepreneurs select their firms as candidates for receiving VC financing and VC investors 
select firms in which they want to invest based on observable and unobservable firm characteristics 
(Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006). We control for such selection issues in our econometric models 
(see more details below).  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables of interest in this study include measures of incremental financing 
events and capital structure. Book values retrieved from balance sheets are used to calculate 
different measures as market variables are unavailable for private firms (Brav, 2009). Previous 
research has shown that the use of book values is not a serious limitation when studying outside 
financing and capital structure decisions (Fama & French, 2002; Leary & Roberts, 2005). 
Following previous research, multiple constructs are selected as dependent variables, 
reflecting incremental finance decisions and capital structure (Brav, 2009; Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 
2009). These include raising outside financing (External Financing), the amount of outside financing 
raised (Ln External Financing), the choice between outside equity versus outside debt (Equity/Debt), 
the amount of outside equity raised (Ln Equity) and the amount of outside debt raised (Ln Debt). We 
further model capital structure decisions with the financial debt ratio (Leverage) as dependent 
variable. While the measures reflecting financing events capture more the dynamics of financing 
strategies at particular points in time, the capital structure of firms provides a snapshot of all 
previous financing events (de Haan & Hinloopen, 2003).  
External Financing is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm raised external 
finance in a given year T. Raising external finance is defined as a minimum five percent increase in 
the total amount of outside debt and equity from year T-1 to year T, relative to pre-issue total assets. 
The minimum threshold of five percent benefits the comparability of our study with prior research 
and allows us to study significant financing events (Brav, 2009; de Haan & Hinloopen, 2003; Leary & 
Roberts, 2010; Vanacker & Manigart, 2010). Firms may issue only outside debt, only outside equity or 
both in year T. A second variable, Equity/Debt, is a dummy variable equal to one if firms raise outside 
equity and zero if firms raise outside debt, treating equity and debt issues as mutually exclusive 
financing events (see Helwege and Liang (1996) for a similar approach). The amount of outside 
financing raised in any given firm-year—including both external equity and debt—(Ln External 
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Financing), of external equity (Ln Equity) and of debt (Ln Debt) were log-transformed before they 
were studied. Our construct for capital structure, Leverage, is defined as the ratio of total financial 
debt on total assets.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
The main explanatory variables in the regression models are constructs that measure 
country-level differences and firm-level differences in corporate governance systems. At the country-
level, we include differences in the quality of the legal framework (Legality Index) and differences in 
the severity of personal bankruptcy law reflected by the ability of entrepreneurs to obtain a fresh 
start after bankruptcy (Discharge Not Available). At the firm-level, we include the effectiveness of 
corporate governance reflected by VC ownership (VC).  
Legality Index. Legality Index is a measure for the quality of the legal framework in each 
country. We use the legality index developed by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003), which is the 
weighted sum of legal measures derived from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000), for several reasons. 
First, Cumming, Fleming and Schwienbacher (2006) have shown that this legality index captures 
differences in national corporate governance systems which are particularly relevant for NTBFs, more 
specifically differences in IPO activity. Second, the legality index is positively related with firm-level 
governance mechanisms like the screening and monitoring activities of VC investors (Cumming, 
Schmidt, & Walz, 2010). Third, the legality index is derived from laws pertaining to investing, the 
quality of enforcement and the need that they will need to be enforced (Cumming, Fleming, & 
Schwienbacher, 2006) which are laws that are relevant for outside investors in NTBFs.  
Discharge Not Available. The variable used to measure cross-country differences in personal 
bankruptcy law, i.e. whether entrepreneurs are able or unable to obtain a fresh start after 
bankruptcy, is based upon Armour and Cumming (2008) but extended to cover the period of study. 
The variable Discharge Not Available is a dummy variable that indicates whether there is a discharge 
from personal indebtedness for entrepreneurs after a bankruptcy or not. The dummy variable takes 
the value one if there is no discharge available for entrepreneurs and thus no opportunity to obtain a 
fresh start and takes the value zero if bankruptcy law foresees a discharge. Bankruptcy law was 
relaxed and a fresh start was introduced during the period of analysis in Belgium (1998), Finland 
(1993) and Italy (2006), so the Discharge Not Available dummy variable shifts from one to zero in the 
year in which the reform took place.  
VC. Prior research indicates that the mere presence of VC investors as shareholders 
influences the operations and governance of firms (e.g., Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Puri & Zarutskie, 
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2012). The variable VC is a dummy variable that captures VC ownership and is hence a construct that 
measures firm-level differences in corporate governance systems. VC is equal to one from the year in 
which the firm receives VC financing (if any), and zero otherwise. In addition, we calculate 
interactions between the VC dummy variable and the country-level variables described above.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Control variables are used in the multivariate analyses, which are largely motivated by prior 
research. They can be aggregated in different categories.  
Firm Accounting Variables. Extant corporate finance literature (Leary & Roberts, 2005, 2010; 
Brav, 2009, Fama & French, 2002) has shown that firm-level accounting variables are important 
determinants of external finance decisions. The amount of internal resources available is defined as 
the beginning year’s cash level plus the net operating cashflow minus the change in working capital 
(Leary & Roberts, 2010). Internal resources are further split into Deficit Funds and Surplus Funds 
where respectively negative values of internal resources are reported and positive values are set 
equal to zero (deficit variable) or vice versa (surplus variable) (Leary & Roberts, 2010; Helwege & 
Liang, 1996). We further control for Size (the logarithm of total assets), Net working capital (accounts 
receivable + inventory – accounts payable), Tangible (asset tangibility), Short Term to Tot Debt (the 
proportion of short term debt to total debt) and T-A Leverage (target minus actual leverage scaled to 
total assets). Target leverage is defined as the predicted leverage obtained from a standard OLS 
leverage regression (Brav, 2009). In our capital structure regression model, we substitute the amount 
of internal funds by ROA (return on assets, defined as EBIT scaled to the average of current and 
preceding total assets) and control for CAPEX (the amount of capital expenditures scaled to total 
assets). 
Firm Non-Accounting Variables. The second category of control variables are non-accounting 
firm-level variables. We control for a firm’s growth in employees (Employee Growth) as high-growth 
firms need more external financing (Gompers, 1995, Mande, Park, & Son, 2012). We further control 
for firm age (Log Firm Age) and the cumulative number of patent applications (# of Patent 
Applications), as both firm age and innovativeness (captured by the number of patent applications) 
are indicators of a firm’s degree of asymmetric information which may affect outside finance options 
(Myers, 1984).  
Other Control Variables. Finally, country-level variables control for between-country 
differences apart from personal bankruptcy law or legal quality. Differences in economic 
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development (GDP Growth) and the development of capital markets (MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital 
International) index) that might affect entrepreneurial activity (Armour & Cumming, 2008) are 
included. We further control directly and indirectly for differences in entrepreneurial activity by 
including Self Employment as a percentage of total employment and Personal minus Corporate tax 
rate (Groh, von Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 2010). Remaining time-variant effects and industry effects 
are captured by year dummies and industry dummies. 
 
Econometric Approach 
 
Five regression specifications study outside financing decisions. Probit models are used for 
the estimation of External Financing and Equity/Debt because the dependent variables are dummy 
variables. Tobit models are used for the estimation of Ln External Financing, Ln Equity and Ln Debt. 
Tobit models account for the fact that the log transformed variables of the amount of financing are 
truncated below by zero (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009). Capital structure is studied using 
Leverage as dependent variable in a pooled OLS regression model. If the probability of attracting VC 
is correlated with the residuals of outside finance decisions or capital structure, the reported results 
might suffer from a selection bias. In all models we therefore include an Inverse Mills Ratio (obtained 
from a probit model estimating the probability that firms raise VC financing). The Inverse Mills Ratio 
corrects for possible selection biases that arise if firms self-select into VC financing or VCs select 
particular firms based on observable and unobservable characteristics (Heckman, 1979). 
The control variables Surplus Funds, Deficit Funds, Tangible, and CAPEX are scaled by total 
assets to control for size effects and to mitigate heteroskedasticity (Brav, 2009). Size, Employee 
Growth, Net Working Capital, Tangible, Short Term to Tot Debt, T-A Leverage, ROA and CAPEX are 
lagged one year to limit potential endogeneity issues. The regressions also include a constant, year 
and industry fixed effects.  
All currency variables are in thousands of euros and corrected for inflation (2008=100). In 
order to mitigate the impact of potential sample outliers, variables were winsorized at the five 
percent level (one-tail winsorizing) if needed. 
Firm-years are the unit of analysis. The coefficients of the regression models are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given firm by the clustering technique 
(Petersen, 2009). We report marginal effects to show the economic significance alongside the 
statistical significance (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009). 
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Panel A reports correlations 
per country-year observation (e.g., country X-1996; 97 observations in total), Panel B reports 
correlations per firm-year observation (e.g., firm X-1996; 50,132 observations in total). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The average value of Legality Index is 19.47. The index value for Finland (21.49), Belgium 
(20.82), U.K. (20.41) and France (19.67) are above the average value, the index value for Italy (17.23) 
and Spain (17.13) fall below the average value. The mean value of Discharge Not Available is 0.38, 
which indicates that in 62 percent of the observations entrepreneurs could obtain a fresh start after 
bankruptcy. VC ownership was reported in on average 7 percent of the firm-year observations. Firms 
are on average 5 years old, have 13 percent of tangible assets and a 4 percent profit margin. External 
Financing was raised in on average 38 percent of the firm-year observations. Conditional on raising 
external financing, the average amount of external financing raised is 3.6 million. Equity (on average 
4.1 million) accounts for 43 percent of all financing events, debt (on average 2.2 million) accounts for 
57 percent. Leverage is on average 15 percent.  
The Pearson correlation coefficients between on the one hand the Legality Index and on the 
other hand debt financing (Equity/Debt), the amount of equity (Ln Equity Amount) and financial debt 
ratios (Leverage) are significantly positive (p<5%). This is consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Discharge not Available is a dummy variable and hence its correlations should be interpreted with 
care. Keeping this caveat in mind, correlation coefficients are significantly negative (p<5%) between 
Discharge not Available and the amount of external financing (Ln External Amount), the amount of 
equity (Ln Equity Amount) and financial debt ratios (Leverage), which is consistent with the second 
hypothesis. 
Unreported Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) indicate that high correlations between the 
Legality Index variable, the Discharge Not Available variable, the VC dummy and their respective 
interactions may lead to multicollinearity problems (VIF>10). We therefore orthogonalize these 
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variables in Stata (using the orthog procedure) and create new orthogonal variables that are used to 
replace the original variables in the regression models. Pollock and Rindova (2003) provide more 
details on this procedure.  
 
Multivariate analyses 
Controlling for selection issues at the firm-level. We first model the propensity of firms to 
raise VC financing, as a first step in the two-step Heckman procedure; the outcome is shown in 
Appendix. Following Eckhart, Shane, and Delmar (2006), the VC selection process is a two-stage 
process in which entrepreneurs first self-select their firms as candidates for VC financing and in the 
second stage VC investors select firms from the pool of firms willing to attract VC funding. 
Irrespective of who selects whom (Hellmann, 2008), the first step of the Heckman correction method 
reports estimates for the only observable outcome of this selection process, namely the event of 
attracting VC financing. 
The dependent variable in the selection equation, VC, is a dummy variable equal to one from 
the moment the firm raises VC financing, zero otherwise. The independent variables that are 
expected to influence the probability of VC financing are the amount of internal funds available, 
disaggregated into Surplus Funds and Deficit Funds. Entrepreneurs are often reluctant to give up 
control thus VC financing is typically viewed as a last resort type of outside financing (Vanacker & 
Manigart, 2010). We therefore expect that the likelihood of the VC financing event increases when 
internal resources are exhausted. Other control variables are Log Firm Age, Employee Growth, Size 
and # of Patent Applications as VC financing is typically associated with NTBFs with significant growth 
ambitions which are especially vulnerable to liabilities of newness and smallness (Zahra & 
Filatotchev, 2004). As a last determinant, the lagged inflation-adjusted yearly inflow of capital in the 
VC industry (VC inflowt-1) is included, which is likely to positively affect deal origination (Gompers & 
Lerner, 1996) and thus also the initial VC financing event. Fixed effects are included to control for all 
other country-, industry- and time specific factors that might affect the event of attracting initial VC 
financing. 
Consistent with expectations, the probability of attracting VC financing increases significantly 
when deficit funds are larger and when firms are younger, report higher growth rates and have more 
patent applications. Firm size is positively associated with the probability of raising VC financing. A 
larger inflow of capital in the VC industry (VC Inflowt-1) also increases, as expected, the probability of 
the VC financing event.  
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In the subsequent section, we test our hypotheses after controlling for the propensity of 
firms to raise VC financing. To do so, we estimate an Inverse Mills Ratio, based on the probit model 
described above, which we include in all subsequent regression models. 
Hypothesis Tests. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we run the multivariate regression models as 
reported in Table 3. All models are significant (unreported). The number of observations in each 
model is different, bounded by the number of observations of the dependent variable. For example, 
the use of external financing is defined for all firm-year observations (almost 13,000), but the 
amount of funding is conditional on raising outside finance, which was observed for 4,099 firm-year 
observations. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that higher quality legal systems will be associated with the use of 
more outside financing in NTBFs, which is strongly supported (p<0.1%). An increase of the Legality 
Index with one unit, which is approximately the difference between the U.K. (20.41) and Finland 
(21.49), increases the probability of outside finance with 17 percent, the amount of outside finance 
with approximately 50 percent (44 percent for outside debt) and 10 percent higher leverage. The 
quality of legal systems does not impact the choice between equity and debt, however, as the 
coefficient of Legality Index is insignificant in the Equity/Debt model. This suggests that equity and 
debt finance become equally more important in higher quality legal systems.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of 
less outside financing in NTBFs. A change of the Discharge Not Available dummy variable from zero 
(fresh start) to one (no fresh start) decreases the probability of outside finance with 3 percent 
(p<5%), decreases the amount of external financing with approximately 9 percent (8 percent for debt 
financing – p<1%) and leads to a 1 percent lower leverage (p<1%). These results thus empirically 
support the second hypothesis. Interestingly, the economic impact of a better overall legal system is 
higher than the impact of more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws. 
VC ownership (VC) is also an important determinant of outside finance decisions. Compared 
with non-VC-backed NTBFs, VC-backed NTBFs raise on average more often and higher amounts of 
outside finance (both 3 percent), more often equity (5 percent) and higher amounts of equity (plus 4 
percent) but less debt and lower amounts of debt (both 5 percent). Interestingly, leverage is not 
significantly different between VC and non-VC-backed firms. The inverse Mills ratio is negative and 
significant suggesting that there exists a negative association between the residuals of the selection 
model and the residuals of the outside finance models. The unobserved factors that are likely to 
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influence the probability of raising VC are thus negatively correlated with the unobserved factors 
that are likely to influence outside finance decisions. 
The effects of the other significant firm-specific variables are largely in line with previous 
findings. More Surplus Funds lead to less outside finance but more Deficit Funds lead to more 
outside finance. Larger firms (Size) raise less often outside finance but the amounts are larger; they 
raise more equity (or less debt) (marginally significant). Firms with higher employee growth raise 
more often outside finance and more often debt (or less equity). A higher net working capital 
increases the amount of debt raised; more patent applications have a negative impact on outside 
finance decisions (and especially debt raised). Asset tangibility, the proportion of short term debt, 
firm age and capital expenditures are positively associated with debt financing, while return on 
assets (ROA) is negatively associated with debt finance. 
Some country-level variables also affect NTBFs’ financing strategies. A higher economic 
development (GDP Growth) results in less outside finance but higher debt ratios. More developed 
capital markets (MSCI) and higher levels of self-employment (Self Employment) are positively 
associated with outside finance, a higher wedge between personal income tax and corporate tax 
(Personal-Corporate Tax) is positively associated with equity finance. 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we add interaction terms to our models. VC*Legality Index is the 
interaction between Legality Index and VC and provides a test of Hypotheses 3A & 3B. VC*Discharge 
Not Available is the interaction between Discharge Not Available and VC and provides a test of 
Hypothesis 4. The results of the models including the interaction terms are reported in Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Hypothesis 3A (3B) predicts that VC ownership decreases (increases) the positive relationship 
between higher quality legal systems and the use of more outside finance. The interaction term 
VC*Legality Index is significant and positive in three models explaining the probability of the use of 
outside finance (External Financing), the amount of outside finance (Ln external financing) and the 
amount of equity (Ln Equity). The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant in the models 
explaining the choice between equity and debt, Equity/Debt, the amount of debt, Ln Debt and 
leverage, Leverage. These results thus support hypothesis 3B: VC ownership complements with 
higher quality legal systems. The positive association between higher quality legal systems and 
outside funding is stronger for VC-backed firms as compared with non-VC-backed firms. Per unit 
increase in legality index, VC-backed firms report a 1 percent additional increase in the use of outside 
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finance, a 3 percent additional increase in the amount of outside finance raised and a 4 percent 
additional increase in the amount of equity finance raised, as compared with non-VC-backed firms. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that VC ownership will increase the negative relationship between less 
forgiving bankruptcy laws and the use of less outside financing. The coefficient of the interaction 
between Discharge Not Available and VC is therefore expected to be significantly negative. We find a 
significantly negative coefficient in the models explaining the amount of outside finance (Ln external 
financing), and the amount of equity (Ln Equity). The coefficient of the interaction term is 
insignificant in the other models. These findings support Hypothesis 4. VC ownership complements 
with less forgiving bankruptcy laws: the negative relationship between less forgiving personal 
bankruptcy laws and the use of outside finance is stronger for VC-backed firms as compared with 
non-VC-backed firms. VC-backed firms report a 3 percent additional decrease in the amount of 
outside finance raised and a 3 percent additional decrease in the amount of equity raised when 
discharge is excluded from bankruptcy law, as compared with non-VC-backed firms. 
The other variables remain robust. Higher quality legal systems (Legality Index) increase 
outside finance, less forgiving bankruptcy laws (Discharge Not Available) decrease outside finance 
and the VC dummy variable (VC) leads to more outside finance, more equity but lower amounts of 
debt. The control variables remain largely the same as in Table 3. 
Robustness Checks. Additional robustness checks were performed; the detailed results of 
these tests are available upon request. Overall, the robustness tests confirm that outside finance 
decisions are affected by country-level differences in corporate governance systems, firm-level 
differences in corporate governance and the interaction between both, irrespective of the construct 
used. In a first robustness test, the strength of investor protection index (Djankov et al., 2005) 
replaced the legality index as a measure of the quality of a country’s legal system. This index 
measures the strength of minority investor protection laws and is positively associated with VC 
activity in European countries (Groh, von Liechtenstein, and Lieser, 2010). The same conclusions 
hold. Second, the personal bankruptcy dummy variable (Discharge Not Available) is replaced by other 
personal bankruptcy measures: time to discharge, minimum capital, exemptions, disabilities and 
composition (Armour & Cumming, 2008). The results remain robust, but are somewhat less strong. 
Our findings suggest that providing a fresh start versus no fresh start is the most important 
dimension of personal bankruptcy law in relation with NTBFs’ finance strategies. In a third robustness 
check, we more explicitly test how VC ownership and thus differences in corporate governance at the 
firm-level affect outside finance decisions. We therefore added interaction terms between the VC 
dummy variable and firm accounting variables to account for the fact that VC ownership may also 
have an impact on the quality of financial reporting (Beuselinck, Deloof & Manigart, 2009). Since it is 
further plausible that the distribution of accounting variables is different between VC and non-VC-
  
25 
 
backed firms, we also identified outliers for each subsample separately. Most of the interaction 
terms were insignificant, however, and did not affect our conclusions. For reasons of conciseness, we 
decided to report models without the interaction terms between the VC dummy variable and the 
firm accounting variables. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Prior entrepreneurial finance research has mainly focused on either firm-level governance 
effects or on the effects of country-level institutional frameworks on the aggregate supply of outside 
financing. This paper expands on prior research and focuses on the joint effects of both country-level 
legal frameworks and firm-level corporate governance. More specifically, this paper focuses on the 
main effects of the quality of a country’s legal system and personal bankruptcy laws and their 
interaction with VC ownership on the financing strategies of NTBFs. For this purpose, we use a large 
longitudinal dataset comprising private NTBFs from six European countries. 
 Using the legality index (Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, 2003) and the availability of personal 
discharge post-bankruptcy (Armour & Cumming, 2006) as proxies for cross-country differences in 
legal institutions relevant for entrepreneurial firms, our empirical findings increase our 
understanding of the role played by national legal frameworks in affecting NTBFs’ financing 
strategies. Specifically, our results show that NTBFs operating in countries with a higher quality legal 
system or with more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws have a higher probability of raising outside 
finance, raise more external finance when they do so (both equity and debt) and have a higher 
leverage. Second, differences in firm-level corporate governance systems also significantly affect 
outside finance, as VC ownership results in a higher probability of raising outside finance, in more 
outside equity when NTBFs engage in equity issues, but in less debt when they engage in debt issues. 
Moreover, the positive association between a country’s legal system and the availability of outside 
financing is stronger for NTBFs financed by VC investors, suggesting a complementary role played by 
VC ownership and a country’s legal system. Further robustness tests using different indicators for a 
country’s legal quality and personal bankruptcy law confirm these results. 
 Our research has some potential limitations that offer fruitful avenues for future research. 
First, as our research design deals with European NTBFs operating in highly (e.g., U.K.) to moderately 
developed (e.g., Spain) VC markets, we lack insight into the role played by those VCs in less 
developed VC markets like Asia or South-America. Moreover, further exploring NTBFs’ financing 
strategies in countries with lower quality of legal systems and the potential role of VC investors 
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herein also remains important. Second, our research does not consider differences in the quality of 
VC investors. Prior research indeed shows that the mere presence of VC investors may be enough to 
influence the operations and governance of firms (e.g., Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Van den Berghe & 
Levrau, 2004). Nevertheless, research also indicates that VC investors are heterogeneous, with high 
quality VC investors having disproportionate positive effects on the development of their portfolio 
firms through stronger monitoring and corporate governance practices (Sorensen, 2007). High 
quality VC investors should hence have an even stronger positive effect on the availability of outside 
financing for their portfolio firms. Further exploring the complementarity between the quality of VC 
investors and a country’s legal system might hence be relevant. Another area of future research 
consists of understanding the role played by different VC investors in syndicates (Devigne, Vanacker, 
Manigart, & Paeleman, 2012). Syndicates comprising different VC investors might differently impact 
their portfolio firms’ financing strategies and differently interact with the country’s legal framework. 
 Despite its limitations, this paper sheds light on the interaction between firm-level 
governance systems and country-level institutional frameworks for the financing strategies of NTBFs. 
Our findings suggest that NTBFs operating in countries with high quality and more forgiving legal 
systems have access to more outside equity and debt, and this effect is even stronger in firms 
financed with VC. We hereby address the recent call to study the interaction between firm-level 
corporate governance factors and national systems of corporate governance. The key implication for 
practice of our research is that a country’s institutional environment strongly affects the financing 
options available to NTBFs, and that stronger firm-level corporate governance practices in the form 
of VC financing enhance the positive effects of a higher quality and more entrepreneur-friendly legal 
environment. Policy-makers, entrepreneurs as well as investors should consider how the quality of 
the legal system and personal bankruptcy laws would affect the financing strategies of 
entrepreneurial firms.   
 
 
NOTES 
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APPENDIX 
 
Selection model estimating the probability of attracting VC funding 
                                                           Probability of VC funding 
Surplus Funds -0.02 
 [0.09] 
Deficit Funds 1.44*** 
 [0.15] 
Size 0.15*** 
 [0.02] 
Employee Growth 0.18*** 
 [0.02] 
Log Firm Age -0.77*** 
 [0.10] 
# of Patent Applications 0.03* 
 [0.01] 
VC Inflowt-1  0.01* 
 [0.00] 
  
Country fixed effects YES 
Year fixed effects YES 
Industry fixed effects YES 
  
# of Observations 18,035 
R² 0.20 
 
This table presents multivariate estimates of the probability that firms attract VC funding for the 
period under study. Firm years are the unit of analysis and coefficients are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given firm. The dependent variable is a 
binary variable equal to one from the year in which firms attract VC financing, zero otherwise. The 
regressions also include a constant, and control for year, country and industry effects (not reported). 
†, *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent 
level correspondingly.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Description of the sample 
 Total Sample VC-backed firms Non VC-backed firms 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Country       
Finland 757 11.11 69 11.39 688 11.08 
Spain 876 12.86 81 13.37 795 12.81 
Belgium 913 13.40 90 14.85 823 13.26 
Italy 1,055 15.49 97 16.01 958 15.43 
UK 1,534 22.52 169 27.89 1,365 21.99 
France 1,678 24.63 100 16.50 1,578 25.42 
Foundation Period       
1984-1989 983 14.43 21 3.47 962 15.50 
1990-1994 1,204 17.67 89 14.69 1,115 17.96 
1995-1999 2,136 31.35 249 41.09 1,887 30.40 
2000-2004 2,490 36.55 247 40.76 2,243 36.14 
Industry       
Other 815 11.96 40 6.60 775 12.49 
Communication 349 5.12 38 6.27 311 5.01 
Life Sciences 631 9.26 102 16.83 529 8.52 
Internet Related 801 11.76 117 19.31 684 11.02 
ICT 1,137 16.69 102 16.83 1,035 16.67 
Software 3,080 45.21 207 34.16 2,873 46.29 
Total 6,813 100.00 606 100.00 6,207 100.00 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: country level correlations (# of observations = 97)    
   
 
  
Discharge Not Available* (1) 0.38 0.49 1.00          
   
 
  
Legality Index (2) 19.47 1.70 -0.75 1.00         
 
    
GDP Growth (3) 2.50 1.47 -0.06 0.10           
   
MSCI (4) 0.97 0.49 -0.36 0.06 0.15 1.00          
Self Employment (5) 17.29 6.14 0.79 -0.73 -0.15 -0.32 1.00        
Personal - Corporate Tax (6) 10.60 6.59 -0.18 0.23 -0.24 -0.20 -0.15 
 
1.00       
Panel B: firm level correlations (# of observations = 50,132)          
External Financing*(7) 0.38 0.49 0.07 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.09 1.00           
Ln External Amount (8) 5.41 2.21 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.05 NA 1.00         
Equity/Debt*(9) 0.43 0.49 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 NA 0.16 1.00       
Ln Equity Amount (10) 5.49 2.34 -0.15 0.12 0.06 0.16 -0.15 0.03 NA 0.98 NA 1.00     
Ln Debt Amount (11) 5.17 1.97 0.14 -0.21 0.08 0.09 0.23 -0.19 NA 0.95 NA 0.71 1.00   
Leverage (12) 0.15 0.22 -0.03 0.15 0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.37 0.08 -0.48 -0.06 0.30 1.00 
VC* (13) 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.04 
Surplus Funds (14) 0.27 0.26 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.02 -0.15 -0.01 -0.38 -0.31 -0.04 -0.29 -0.27 -0.25 
Deficit Funds (15) 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.45 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.22 0.26 
Size (16) 6.25 1.98 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.80 -0.02 0.80 0.83 0.06 
Employee Growth (17) 1.21 0.77 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.00 
Net Working Capital (18) 0.13 0.31 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 
# of Patent Applications(19) 0.40 6.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.00 
Tangible (20) 0.13 0.18 0.15 -0.04 0.10 -0.21 0.09 -0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.22 
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TABLE 2 
Continued 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Short Term to Tot Debt (21) 0.37 0.42 -0.18 0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.26 0.12 0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.12 0.05 0.10 
Log Firm Age (22) 0.81 0.32 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.21 0.07 -0.20 0.06 0.16 -0.01 
T-A Leverage (23) 0.01 0.19 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.54 
ROA (24) 0.04 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.28 -0.24 -0.34 -0.24 -0.16 -0.15 
CAPEX (25) 0.06 0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.10 
 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)  
VC* (13) 1.00                          
Surplus Funds (14) -0.09 1.00                        
Deficit Funds (15) 0.14 -0.39 1.00                      
Size (16) 0.15 -0.19 0.01 1.00                    
Employee Growth (17) 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.07 1.00                  
Net Working Capital (18) -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.00                
# of Patent Applications(19) 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.00              
Tangible (20) -0.04 -0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00            
Short Term to Tot Debt (21) -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00          
Log Firm Age (22) -0.08 0.03 -0.15 0.23 -0.25 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.06 1.00        
T-A Leverage (23) 0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1.00      
ROA (24) -0.29 0.28 -0.40 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.06 1.00    
CAPEX (25) 0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 1.00  
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Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation and Pearson correlation coefficients (two-tail) between all variables. Coefficients in bold denote statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression models: Main effects  
 External 
financing 
Ln external 
financing 
Equity/Debt Ln Equity Ln Debt Leverage 
Legality Index 0.17*** 0.42*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.37*** 0.10*** 
 [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04] [0.01] 
Discharge not Available -0.03* -0.09** -0.02 -0.07 -0.08** -0.01** 
 [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.00] 
VC 0.03*** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.04** -0.05*** 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
Surplus Funds -0.63*** -0.52*** 0.05 -0.77*** -0.17+  
 [0.03] [0.08] [0.06] [0.14] [0.10]  
Deficit Funds 1.94*** 2.29*** 0.61*** 1.29*** 2.07***  
 [0.22] [0.13] [0.11] [0.18] [0.15]  
Size -0.06*** 0.74*** 0.02+ 0.75*** 0.77*** -0.02*** 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] 
Employee Growth 0.02** -0.05** -0.04** -0.07* -0.05** -0.02*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00] 
Net Working Capital 0.00 0.02  0.02 0.06*  
 [0.00] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.03]  
# of Patent Applications -0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.02*** -0.01** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tangible   -0.08   0.22*** 
   [0.07]   [0.02] 
Short Term to Tot Debt   -0.13***   0.06*** 
   [0.03]   [0.01] 
Log Firm Age   -0.33***   0.10*** 
   [0.07]   [0.01] 
T-A Leverage   -0.09    
   [0.06]    
ROA      -0.09*** 
      [0.01] 
CAPEX      0.11*** 
      [0.03] 
       
GDP Growth -0.02+ -0.08** -0.01 -0.12** -0.01 0.02*** 
 [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.00] 
MSCI  0.39*** 1.08*** 0.02 1.14*** 0.89*** 0.20*** 
 [0.03] [0.08] [0.07] [0.13] [0.09] [0.02] 
Self Employment -0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 0.01*** 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
Personal – Corporate Tax -0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.02** -0.00 -0.00*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
       
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.48*** -1.55*** 0.01 -1.63*** -1.04*** -0.17*** 
 [0.03] [0.06] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07] [0.01] 
       
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
# of Observations 12,977 4,099 2,546 1,947 2,686 13,467 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.12 0.37 0.39 0.21 
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Table 3 presents multivariate estimates of the outside finance decisions and leverage. 
Firm year observations are the unit of analysis. The coefficients represent the average 
partial effect of the coefficients, corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across 
observations of a given firm to show the economic significance alongside the statistical 
significance. The regressions also include a constant, and control for year and industry 
effects (coefficients not reported). †, *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent level correspondingly. 
  
41 
 
 
TABLE 4 
 Regression models including VC interaction 
 External 
financing 
Ln external 
financing 
Equity/Debt Ln Equity Ln Debt Leverage 
Legality Index 0.16*** 0.39*** -0.01 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.10*** 
 [0.01] [0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.01] 
Discharge not Available -0.02* -0.08** -0.02 -0.05 -0.08** -0.01** 
 [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.00] 
VC 0.03*** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.05*** 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] 
VC* Legality Index 0.01*** 0.03** 0.01 0.04** -0.00 -0.00 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] 
VC* Discharge not Available 0.00 -0.03** -0.01 -0.03+ -0.01 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
Surplus Funds -0.63*** -0.52*** 0.05 -0.77*** -0.18+  
 [0.03] [0.08] [0.06] [0.14] [0.10]  
Deficit Funds 1.93*** 2.25*** 0.59*** 1.25*** 2.07***  
 [0.22] [0.13] [0.11] [0.18] [0.15]  
Size -0.06*** 0.74*** 0.02 0.75*** 0.77*** -0.02*** 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] 
Employee Growth 0.02* -0.05** -0.04** -0.07** -0.05** -0.02*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00] 
Net Working Capital 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.06*  
 [0.00] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.03]  
# of Patent Applications -0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tangible   -0.07   0.22*** 
   [0.07]   [0.02] 
Short Term to Tot Debt   -0.13***   0.06*** 
   [0.03]   [0.01] 
Log Firm Age   -0.33***   0.10*** 
   [0.07]   [0.01] 
T-A Leverage   -0.09    
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   [0.06]    
       
ROA      -0.09*** 
      [0.01] 
CAPEX      0.11*** 
      [0.03] 
GDP Growth -0.02 -0.08** -0.00 -0.12** -0.01 0.02*** 
 [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.00] 
MSCI  0.39*** 1.07*** 0.02 1.10*** 0.89*** 0.20*** 
 [0.03] [0.08] [0.07] [0.13] [0.09] [0.02] 
Self Employment -0.00 0.01* -0.00 -0.00 0.04*** 0.01*** 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
Personal – Corporate Tax -0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* -0.00 -0.00*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
       
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.49*** -1.56*** -0.01 -1.66*** -1.04*** -0.17*** 
 [0.03] [0.06] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07] [0.01] 
       
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
# of Observations 12,977 4,099 2,546 1,947 2,686 13,467 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.11 0.37 0.39 0.21 
 
 
Table 4 presents multivariate estimates of the outside finance decisions and leverage adding the interaction terms between Legality Index and VC 
(VC* Legality Index) and between Discharge Not Available and VC (VC* Discharge not Available). Firm years are the unit of analysis. The 
coefficients represent the average partial effect of the coefficients, corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a 
given firm. The regressions also include a constant, and control for year and industry effects (coefficients not reported). †, *, **,*** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent level correspondingly. 
